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Without a crisscrossing common premise and quite distinctive in content, format,
and length, the aforementioned works share joint ideas on the theme of  globalised
capitalism. Tariq Ali and Vijay Prashad insist on the dominance of  American capital,
and respectively on the transition from American liberalism to American neoliber-
alism, although Ali takes a journalistic approach and Prashad provides a historical
account on the matter. Chibber gets tangentially connected with the two, though
his theoretically framed message stands on a parallel road from the factual ones of
his colleagues. 
An indirect defense of  Marxism, Chibber’s text criticizes the field of  sub-
altern studies and connects with Tariq Ali in contesting certain presuppositions and
assumptions with regards to European dominance and Eurocentrism, while tackling
the universalisation of  capital within our transnational, global era. It joins Prashad
in addressing the North-South political dynamics and argues that models of  ration-
ality and modernization were used in the South to partially escape the Northern
subservience. Prashad further shows how such rationality was economically co-
opted by neoliberalism. 
This essay engages with the content thematically rather than analyzing the
books on an individual basis, simultaneously reflecting on their common and di-
vergent argumentative points.
Capital and Its Universalisation 
The ideological culture of  global capitalism, Tariq Ali argues, raises profits by re-
moving institutional obstacles, citizens, countries and progressive tax reforms, and
by claiming a fake congruence between corporate interests and working class needs.
Chibber demonstrates that capital’s universalisation is a routine phenomenon within
the twentieth century, diversely occurring all around the globe and without neces-
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sarily disturbing local cultures, a thesis contested by the field of  post-colonial and
subaltern studies, which argued for the peculiar aspect of  capitalism in the East. 
Subalternists’ argument, as outlined by Chibber, claims that capital’s uni-
versalisation developed from within the context of  Europe’s bourgeois revolutions,
in 1640 in England and 1789 in France, where the dominance of  capitalist classes
relied on peasantry and workers’ consent. Feudalism was overthrown, secularism
and socialism were subsequently established, and a national market and community
were created in virtue of  liberal principles of  rights, liberties, and equality. In South
Asia, the subalternists argue—India in particular, as per Partha Chatterjee’s claim—
the bourgeoisie was unable to destroy the ancient regime. In fact, it accommodated
feudal classes and older forms of  pre-modern politics, hence creating capitalism
without a capitalist culture and without capitalist power relations. In contrast with
England and France, where domination integrated the dominated working classes
into the political project of  the nation, the Indian bourgeoisie did not speak for the
nation and used coercion to relate to the landed classes, hence exercising dominance
and not hegemony, i.e. Ranajit Guha’s argument, whereas hegemony is defined via
dominance on consent and not through coercion. Without hegemony, the Indian
bourgeoisie remained cemented within a pre-bourgeois consciousness—i.e. Dipesh
Chakrabarty’s argument—around communal, ethnic and religious ties, and aban-
doned capitalism’s universalising drive. The dominant axis of  politics was overlaid
on community and ethnicity and not on class based bourgeois rationality. 
In India, the argument continues, capital relied on interpersonal forms of
domination—Chakrabarty exemplifies with the working relations in Calcutta jute
mills, where a Scottish manager would act much more coercively than he would
ever act at home—and not on typical European forms of  impersonal and institu-
tional coercion (123). Marxist and liberal theories are only valid in settings with a
secure bourgeois culture and inadequate for understanding Indian, Eastern realities,
which had different historical trajectories. Postcolonial theoretical categories need
to encompass the fragmented particularities of  the East and to be positioned against
totalizing and homogenizing European concepts. 
Chakrabarty criticises Marxist analyses because they incorporate local par-
ticularities within a universalised history of  capital, indifferent of  local differences,
hence socio-political situations are deemed to be the same in Detroit as in Bombay,
for example (221). Chakrabarty distinguishes between History 1, whereas local in-
stitutions and structures contribute to capitalist reproduction, once capitalism gets
established in a former non-capitalist region, and History 2, whereas not all practices
assist capitalism’s reproduction; some remain independent and disrupt the univer-
salisation of  capital. Capitalism globalised every corner of  the world, however, this
alone does not imply its universalisation in terms of  producing similar political and
cultural transformations in the East and the West. 
Chibber contra-attacks the subalternists claim(s) to fundamental difference
for being grounded on faulty understandings of  the British and French revolutions
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as bourgeois events (Chapter 3). The English Revolution, Chibber argues, was not
anti-feudal. It happened after the transition to capitalism; hence it was more about
what type of  capitalism England should have. Its bourgeois oligarchy was indifferent
to subaltern interests and only accommodated them when necessary; for example,
lower orders were excluded from politics; the electoral arena was dominated by the
Whig and Tory oligarchies; trade unions did not get legal protection until 1871; de-
mands of  Levellers and Quakers were ignored. Similarly, in France, while The Third
Estate aimed to dismantle the absolutist state and to change it into a constitutional
monarchy, there was no commitment to the rights of  subaltern groups. Mass de-
mands were oftentimes marginalised; for example, electoral rights were withheld
until mid-century; the right to strike was not granted until 1864; that of  establishing
trade unions not until mid 1880s, and that of  free and universal education not until
1802. The Third Estate was neither revolutionary nor capitalist. Out of  the 610
representatives only 90 had ties with commerce. They represented what we would
call today the salaried middle class, employees or independent producers, only claim-
ing larger rights for themselves. Subaltern classes, the peasantry in particular, forced
their concerns by way of  revolt. The revolution had finally become anti-feudal and
democratic yet not because of  a “bourgeois project” but because peasants forced
in their involvement. 
In the classic understanding, the European events were pivotal in the de-
velopment of  capitalism and liberalism, however, for Chibber, such a causal link is
weak; their main contribution was the strengthening of  state-building and nation-
building identities. In fact, both the Indian bourgeoisie and the European elites
aimed to minimise the power of  subaltern demands and push out the labouring
classes, hence reaching hegemony without consent. The European experience, thus,
is not a benchmark for hegemonic success. 
Chibber argues that the power relations in Chakrabarty’s capitalist jute
mills were congruent with other coercive forms of  capitalist production, regardless
of  these being colonial or not. What capitalism universalises, Chibber states, is a
strategy of  economic reproduction. Irrespective of  geographical location, managers
directly or indirectly extend control over workers. The same arbitrary managerial
practices are used in England, US and Bengal, for example. To maximise profit,
employers extract the maximum labour from employees, thus the real goal of  pro-
duction is the exchange-value—the abstract labour, relationally rewarded via com-
parison with other labourers—and not necessarily the concrete value. To extract
work, capitalists also oppose collective organising and take advantage of  inherent
cultural or ethnic divisions within labour.  
Abstract labour appears in concrete identities, as in concrete labourers,
however, since the labour market-site is one of  generalised insecurity, no one is
guaranteed employment. People rely on familial and social networks, hence racial
and ethnic community ties became tools for cementing material security. These pre-
constructed divisions lead to capital’s accumulation via identitary difference, an ar-
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gument also referred to by Marx, that capitalists promote racial differentiation, for
example, in having used Irish workers as a way of  weakening the trade unions in
England. 
Chibber argues (224-246) that for as long as History 1 established itself
and gets reproduced over time, we can infer its universalisation. Even if  History 2
modifies capital’s reproduction, it does not change its basic rules of  replication.
Both histories can coexist in parallel, without antagonism, particularly as raced and
gendered political processes are easily absorbed within the cycles of  capitalist ac-
cumulation. Corrosive conditions that lead to capital’s destabilisation, entrepre-
neurism and plunge the economy into crisis, can also exist within History 1, as shown
by major theoreticians of  capitalism, Smith and Keynes. Similar to what Prashad
writes in relation to Marx and Engels’ prediction, of  capitalism breaking away from
its European roots, and globalising, while maintaining older forms of  repression. 
Capital’s universalising tendency is supported by what Tariq Ali calls the
extreme centre, a mainstreaming of  politics whereas all parliamentary parties, from
centre-right to centre-left preserve the dominance of  capital. The extremes are not
at the ends of  the political spectrum, but rather within its centre, sustaining the
market in a fundamentalist way. This “symbiosis of  big money and minimalist pol-
itics” (42), has become “a model for the new-style democracies” (148). Prashad also
refers to the neoliberalism with southern characteristics, showing the extreme-centre
tendencies within the South as another example of  the universalisation of  capital.
According to Chibber, it is irrelevant that Marxist and post-enlightment
theories are Eurocentric, since the East and the West share a global history, where
the universalisation of  capital follows, more or less, a similar logic. Theories origi-
nating in Europe can also be applied to the East and postcolonial understandings
of  capitalism, politics, history, and agency should be questioned. The subalternist
predicament, that the Global South cannot be interpreted via Western concepts of
historical materialism, is also destabilised by Prashad’s references to the neoliberal-
ism with Southern traits (Chapter 2).
The Americanisation of  Capital 
Capitalist supremacy is driven by Washington, Ali argues. Existent disputes with
China, Russia, and the servile EU are unable to challenge the technological, geo-
graphical and ideological US imperial domination, strongly sustained by the cultural
principles of  wealth accumulation, worship of  money, and private property (77).
The US started its hegemonic trajectory in 1971, Prashad states (25) when, unable
to pay its creditors, it delinked the dollar from the gold standard. This enabled the
US to print currency and run deficits, a move followed by UK and other European
nations. Currencies floating one against another led to short-term instability and to
investors turning to commodities to protect against inflation, which raised the prices
of  gold and oil. Countries were now holding the US dollar as a tool for wealth, and
with the dollar standard substituting the gold one, Washington could manoeuvre
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the world.
The US uses NATO to preserve its global hegemony and to keep its Eu-
ropean allies at bay, writes Ali (110). NATO was initially set up in 1949 to block So-
viet aggression against the West. During the Cold War, NATO was mainly a
propaganda tool to control allies rather than to fight enemies. After the Cold War,
it continued to keep European powers under American influence and to transform
the former Soviet Bloc countries into compliant US satellites. Four dozen military
interventions were conducted by NATO after the Cold War, a much higher number
in comparison with the sixteen NATO operations that took place during the Cold
War years. In 2010, the US had 662 bases overseas in Central Europe, Middle East,
Asia Pacific, Caribbean, East/West Africa and 88 on US territories. Following the
tensions in Yugoslavia, NATO bombed Serbia; it intervened in Afghanistan by arm-
ing the Mujahideen radicals with Saudi and Pakistani help, and carried out bom-
bardments in Libya in 1981 and 1986; it deployed troops in Sinai; it sustained the
Israeli invasion of  Lebanon; it backed the reactionary Hindu Kush who aimed to
destabilise the Marxist government in Kabul; and supported South Africa’s
apartheid regime. Prashad also mentions (Chapter 2) the violence within Central
America, where the US joined reactionary forces to supress revolutionary move-
ments. The US used Honduras as a base for arming right-wing paramilitaries; it in-
vaded Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989 (131). The US labeled Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, and North Korea as “rogue” states, countries outside the international system
whose aim is to destroy the system. Jacques Derrida, however, has later inverted
the “rogue” label back on the US, in his ‘Essays on Reason’ (Derrida 2005). 
Masked under so-called progressive ideas of  “third way,” “conflict-free
politics,” and “beyond left and right,” European politics are nowadays Atlanticised
and the British polity is subservient to the US. Yet, US hegemony is in continuous
decline, Ali argues (76). The richest global country cannot care, feed, or employ its
poor, mainly African Americans and Hispanics. One in seven Americans, twenty
five percent of  children and twenty percent of  elderly are living below the poverty
line. In 1998, under Bill Clinton, the wages of  the bottom 80 percent were lower
than in 1989, and much lower than 1979. US workers labour ten to twenty percent
more hours than Western Europeans, and even more than the Japanese. Spending
on wars and national security, seven trillion dollars since 2001, as documented by
Prashad (19), was accompanied by cuts to social services and tax breaks for the rich.
Prashad and Ali agree that although US has a weakened economic status, it still
dominates ideologically and militarily, hence we will not see its collapse anytime
soon. 
With the victory of  Hayek and the Chicago school, neoliberalism suc-
ceeded when the whole world accepted the Washington consensus (Ali 56). This
paved the way for privatizations at home and wars abroad. Ali exemplifies with the
privatization of  the Nationalized Health Services (NHS) in the UK, previously one
of  the most socialised health care systems. The 2010 Health and Social Care Act,
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he argues, is now modelled after the American system. Universal health care was
abolished, hence people were forced to resort to private health insurance. Ali pres-
ents an interview with Allyson Pollock, Professor of  Public Health at Queen Mary
University London, who argues that the NHS privatisation is reflective of  the US
style neoliberal politics (35-36). The US exhausted its own funds within the health
care industry, running at eighteen percent of  GDP, where a nine to ten percent
GDP in Europe has led health care investors to look for new markets. Prashad ar-
gues that Hayek’s ideological triumph also allowed the G7 to consolidate their power
and to take advantage of  colonial contexts, insisting that the South should export
its way out of  crisis. In 1987, the South sent 30 billion in debt payments to the
North. This undermines David Harvey’s idea, that neoliberalism started in New
York and got imported via IMF to the rest of  the world, Prashad argues (151). In
fact, neoliberalism triumphed incipiently in the Global South, sustained by the ide-
ological commitment of  the elites in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
In 1970, the US exploited its downturn crisis to restore profitability. The
government assaulted its own economy, Prashad writes (58), in the hope that de-
struction would create something anew. Credit was severely tightened, interest rates
rose as high as twenty-one percent by 1980, the old manufacturing sector collapsed,
and Americans could no longer keep their standards of  living. In the beginning of
Reagan’s administration, there was a systematic attack on labour and trade unions.
When Reagan later introduced Keynesianism, the new asset bubbles created by
credit card and real estate debt increased Wall Street’s power over the state and so-
ciety. Low interest rates in the North allowed financial institutions to inflate credit
and consumption. They enabled large sums to travel the globe in search for invest-
ment opportunities, which increased Brazil, India, and South Africa’s ability to ex-
port services. But, these reforms had differential effects: the rich benefitted much
more at the expense of  the poor; growth did not just come from industries such as
information technology, but also from cannibalistic economic activity, including pri-
vatization and real estate speculation. The growth rate expanded the middle class
but it increased inequality between classes and within regions: high urban unem-
ployment among working class, high rates of  farming suicides in India and destruc-
tion of  labour unions and labour protections. Weakened labour led to the
development of  the informal sector in these countries, which deepened social divi-
sions. In 2000, William Easterly, the Senior Adviser in the Macroeconomic Division
at World Bank said that countries who borrowed from IMF and World Bank would
be worst off. IMF and World Bank knew that people wanted social goods yet they
continued to champion growth as the only way for development, Prashad states
(207).
When the US raised interest rates, this had a catastrophic effect on the
Third World, Prashad continues (60). In 1973, the Global South states had a debt
of  130 billion, which rose to 612 billion by 1982. The South wanted an International
Debt Commission yet the North refused to see their debt as political. Real farmers
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in the US and Europe were replaced with factory farming. Subsidies to the Atlantic
agriculture gave the North advantages in the global food market. And via Free Trade
agreements such as NAFTA in 1994, the North eliminated producers from Mexico,
India, Ghana, and Bangladesh. Migrations followed, as impoverished rural workers
from the South, especially women, joined factories to create products for the At-
lantic shops.
Sensing the widening disparity between the North and the South, since
according to the World Bank 700 million people lived in absolute poverty in 1979,
and aiming to counter the political risks of  rebellion, the Brandt report was pub-
lished in 1980, to address such issues, by the Independent Commission. The idea
was to extend Keynesianist principles into the international arena and to transfer
wealth to the South, which will be used to buy goods from the North, to bring the
Northern economy back to life (75). To transfer the wealth, aid levels would be in-
creased and a World Development Fund would be set up through progressive taxes
on Gross National Products, on international trade, on military expenditure and
mining. The money would be released without conditions. The Brandt report,
framed on the idea of  “mutual interests,” was the main statement of  American lib-
eralism focused on the well-being of  the global poor, Prashad argues, although it
did not directly acknowledge the role of  power per se.
The Brandt report was well received by social democrats both in the North
and the South. The G7 met to discuss it. Reagan did not want to attend, but
Thatcher urged him to. In October 1981 in Cancun, twenty-two states attended the
International meeting for Cooperation and Development. Cuba was not allowed to
participate. The USSR stayed out on the premise that Global South problems are
the result of  colonialism, hence it is the West alone that needs to answer to its his-
tory. Reagan brought forward a neoliberal agenda, arguing that poverty cannot be
transcended overnight; that the road to prosperity is only via economic freedom
and individual incentives; that the US program of  free trade should aid the private
sector and not the government; and that free trade and liberalised financial systems
and not wealth transfers should be the engines for development. The Brandt team
was defeated. It later met in Kuwait in 1982 to debrief  Cancun and came out with
a book that received little attention—Common Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World
Recovery. The Cancun summit, Prashad writes (87), finished the Atlantic liberalism
and moved the agenda to neoliberalism.
By 1987, the debt in the South was sitting at 47 percent of  the gross na-
tional products. Chandra Hardy’s papers at the World Bank, on the Mexican and
African debts, argued for debt cancelation or at least debt restructuring on conces-
sional terms, for instance lengthening the repayment period and revisiting the pay-
ments on a yearly basis, so countries should not have to cut away their basic
livelihoods. However, Hardy’s position was not fully endorsed by the South, as
Prashad shows (Chapter 2). Manmohan Singh, for example, the General Secretary
for the South Commission, did not advocate for debt cancelation, rather for con-
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verting it into securities and trading it at a discounted rate. This way the banks would
get some of  their money back and the South would move towards a growth agenda.
Washington’s neoliberal logic continued in a similar manner during the re-
cent 2008 economic crisis. Credit-induced consumerism combined with real estate
and financial speculation produced the jobless growth that crashed in 2007. The
US absorbed billions of  dollars from the Global South to cover its current deficit.
The poor financed the rich, Prashad states. The US and the EU bailed the falling
banks, Ali also argues (101) and people had to pay for a deregulated banking system
and for dismantling of  the social welfare state. The housing bubble was supported
by Wall Street, Ali continues, which encouraged people to take on second mortgages
and higher personal debts. When the bubble collapsed, the banks were the ones
rescued. The EU imposed austerity favouring the German, French, and British
banking systems, further collapsing the countries of  Ireland, Greece, and Iceland,
while keeping Spain, Portugal and Italy in precarity. The responsibility for the crisis
was placed on Southern Europe, although no one drew attention to the high dereg-
ulation of  high finance, writes Prashad. The US introduced Keynesianism to stim-
ulate its economy, however, in Europe, the solution became about punishing the
poorest states, according to Ali (57-58). In Greece, for example, youth unemploy-
ment is very high and wages are down by 50 percent. In Spain, single pensions and
salaries are sustaining entire households, with unemployment at 26 percent and ca-
sual labour paid at two to three euros per hour. Italy is in recession, with 42 percent
of  Italians unemployed. In Portugal, family businesses, which have for long sup-
ported the economy, have vanished, and those without work cannot even access
unemployment benefits. In Ireland the best and the brightest have left. The Euro-
pean Troika, composed of  European Commission, the European Central Bank and
IMF now governs Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and Greece. 
At the time of  the Greek financial collapse, the idea was to cut government
spending and tax the working class and the precariat without touching the con-
sumption of  the elites, says Prashad (244-246). Merkel promoted austerity. Obama,
a light version of  Keynesianism. Yet Obama had in mind the US economy, on the
premise that an anticipated collapse of  the European banks will threaten the US
banking system and a Grexit would trigger similar issues in Italy and Spain, countries
in which US banks were much more leveraged. Obama’s Keynesianism had little to
do with social good and more with creating a firewall for protecting banks, argues
Prashad. 
Atlantic dominance is also visible in relation to international property
rights. Atlantic transnational firms hold the patent over the most advanced tech-
nologies needed for economic growth. Much of  the Northern growth was built by
controlling intellectual property, says Prashad (Chapter 2). Jobless growth and debt-
fuelled consumerism relies on rents paid on intellectual property, including brands
and designs, subsequently locking the South out of  scientific and technological de-
velopments.
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To maintain its dominance, the US has always tried to shut down interna-
tional dissent. For example, when Japan, suspicions of  World Bank’s protection of
EU and US interests, supported the creation of  the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), Washington spoke against it, demanding conditions of  privatisation and
free market principles for giving out loans. When the AIDS epidemic reached cat-
astrophic levels in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1990s, and South Africa
passed the Medicines Amendment Act to allow imports of  cheaper medicine from
India, under the former Indian Patent Act, which protected the process and not
the product, firms could sell AIDS drugs at a fraction of  the prices advertised by
the Northern companies. The US pressured South Africa to revoke its law, threat-
ening to reduce aid to the country and placing it on the Special 301 watch list; it
was later removed from the list due to pressures from the AIDS movement. 
Americanism has become the only feasible internationalism. Without the
Soviet Bloc, Francis Fukuyama’s prediction, that inequalities will not disappear and
dramatic social transformations, such as socialism, would no longer occur, came
true. America was sold as the planet’s future, with its free trade agreements and
open borders for business. The North acted its imperial dominance by having its
wishes multiplied, while the South’s pleas were just “sometimes added, [and] mainly
subtracted” (Prashad, 26). 
The Left as the Extreme Centre and Neoliberalism with Southern 
Characteristics 
It is the internationalism of  the New Labour that subordinated British polity to the
US, Ali states (44). Labour is nowadays a party of  war and finance. Under Tony
Blair the gaps between executive salaries and average wages have become the largest
in Europe. Between 1990-1996, a million people lost their homes through repos-
session by mortgage companies, and in 2009 alone, one million properties were in
negative equity. The flexible labour market encouraged individualism and con-
sumerism, normalised unemployment, and rationed disability and housing benefits
to means-tested payments and incentives to work. 
New Labour additionally gave full authority to the Bank of  England to
determine monetary policy and detached it from government control; it cut welfare
benefits for single mothers, and it charged tuition fees to all university students,
measure opposed by the former Conservative government. Despite protests, uni-
versity fees were raised in 2004 and 2010, on the premise that those benefiting from
higher education should fund it. When the former conservative government priva-
tized the railways, the Labour, once in power, pledged for public-private partnerships
on transport, although 65-85 percent of  the public opinion was in favour of  rena-
tionalising the railways.
Ali gives a financial account of  New Labour party members (Chapter 1).
Tony Blair, the former Prime Minister has a fortune estimated at 40-60 million. He
owns two limited liability companies: Firerush Ventures and Windrush Ventures.
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Alan Milburn, former Health Secretary and a former radical leftist, is nowadays the
Director of  Covidien, a global multibillion health care company and an Adviser for
Lloyd’s Pharmacy Healthcare, Pepsico and the private equity firm Bridgepoint.
Charles Clarke, former Education Secretary and Home Secretary also worked as a
KPMG consultant. Hilary Armstrong, former Secretary of  State was the Chairper-
son of  the waste company SITA. Stephen Byers, once part of  the far left is now
the Chairman of  the water treatment company ACWA and Ritz Climate Offset
Company. Richard Caborn, former Sports Minister, works as a Consultant to
AMEC (nuclear industry) and the Fitness Industry Association. Frank Field, former
Welfare Reform Minister is the Director of  Medicash. These are only some of  the
many aforesaid examples. The Labour Party followed the same steps as the Tories,
which is why Ali talks about the extreme centre as having the same ideological line
from right to the left. 
With the transition to American neoliberalism, extreme centre tendencies
have also became visible in the South, Prashad demonstrates (Chapter 2). Global
South countries wanted acceptance within the First World and integration within
capitalist structures. Julius Nyerere, the former chairman for the South Commission,
initially pushed for an agenda of  freedom and equality, eradication of  poverty, a
minimum standard of  living, a ceiling on wealth for individuals and nations and a
resources transfer from the rich to the poor. Nyerere aimed to promote a strategy
of  solidarity in the South and to seek unity as an instrument of  liberation and not
of  domination. The Commission’s work was divided: some favoured a people cen-
tered development, around a strategy of  basic needs, and some wanted growth-led
development, as in modeling the Atlantic North. Yet a people-centered development
would have had to include women, Indigenous people, slum dwellers, and such an
approach was not ultimately endorsed by the Commission. These groups raised is-
sues of  deprivation and environmental collapse, however the actions of  Indigenous
people faced as much resistance in the South as they did in the North, for example,
displacement was common in the case of  Barabaig people under Nyerere’s regime.
Overall the South Commission did not actually see (Indigenous) ‘people’ as essential
to their new project. The rhetoric of  people-centred development, in terms of  the
language of  basic needs, production for domestic consumption, common planning
and development of  regional solidarity links, was hijacked by the neoliberal agenda
of  deregulation and good governance. 
In the 1990s, the final report of  the South Commission argued for the
transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial one. The document prioritised
growth as a solution to the Third World problems. The idea was to imitate the new
industrialised countries of  the Pacific Rim: South Korea, Taiwan and China, the
only ones showing some success in terms of  their GDP, which is why the Com-
mission put forward Third World multinationals, such as Samsung and Hyundai.
China became the main locomotive of  the South. Benefiting from the Maoist fruits,
including a generation of  healthy, literate and able people (Prashad 226), China was
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able to move from an agricultural state devastated by the Japanese occupation to
an industrialised country rivalling the North. 
The simultaneous invasion of  Kuwait by Sadam Hussein, which coincided
with the release of  the Commission’s final report in Caracas, drifted the public at-
tention away from the South. The G7 states said the report does not have a clear
commitment to the market, the only guarantee for a successful economy. In Havana,
Fidel rejected the report, particularly on the premise that it posed the market as the
most natural institution for resource distribution. The neoliberalism with Southern
characteristics has started. Not as a capitulation to the North but as a new approach,
as Prashad shows.
By the early 2000s, the research analysts at Goldman Sachs started to pay
attention to the new Southern alliance comprised of  Brazil, Russia, India and China
(BRICS). These states had very large populations and were major producers of
goods and services. Brazil and Russia supplied raw materials to India and China,
who then supplied manufactured goods and services to the North. Yet the Southern
locomotives had little political power and they could not push issues of  debt transfer
onto the agenda. BRICS did not really challenge the Northern dominance. Unable
to stand against the US and NATO military power and unable to create a new in-
stitutional an ideological alternative to neoliberalism (another example of  the uni-
versalisation of  capital), BRICS mainly looked for entry into the institutions
controlled by the North and started to advocate for democracy at IMF, World Bank
and the UN. They did manage however, to be partially integrated into the decision-
making. In 2003, France invited the Plus5 countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico
and South Africa) to the G8 Evian summit. At the next two summits, G8 leaders
spoke of  institutionalising a dialogue with the South’s locomotives. Angela Merkel
wanted the G8 and the Plus5 to create the conditions for global economic stability. 
In pushing reforms to please the North-Atlantic markets, the South leaders
did not talk about neoliberalism but about modernisation. Brazil, India and South
Africa pressed for policies with three main orientations: to please the bond market
by cleaning fiscal and monetary policy, as in to cut deficits, re-evaluate currency
within the dollar regime, and privatize state run enterprises; to please the multina-
tional corporations and to accede to the new intellectual property regimes; and to
discipline workers, as in veering away funds from social welfare to individualised
training. From 2008 onwards, the locomotives of  the South were ironically expected,
says Prashad, to drag the North out of  its debt crisis.
Culture and Ideology Substituting Capitalism and Class 
Despite the universalisation of  capital, discussions largely rest, nowadays, in cri-
tiquing culture and ideology, particularly vis-à-vis the ideas of  Eurocentrism, na-
tionalism, colonialism and economic determinism, trends especially supported by
the post-colonial field of  studies. As Chibber shows, subalternists such as Chatterjee
and Chakrabarty claim that agents in the East have a different psychology and dif-
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ferent peasant consciousness than agents in the West. Conceptions of  individual
rights, rationality and self-interest are predominant in the West while in the East
those of  duty, obligation, honour, religiosity and community, prevail. It is why En-
lightment theories of  class are inadequate to explain peasants’ political agency. 
Yet thinking that the East is solely an other-orientated culture, lacking no-
tions of  individuality and material self-interest, has deep Orientalist inclinations,
Chibber argues. For instance, in the case of  Muslim peasants’ agitations against the
traditional Hindu landlords—named zamindars in Bengali—the wealthy jotedars,
also Muslim, mobilised general peasant demands by appealing to material interests.
The jotedars possessed wealth, resources and connections, which made them an
asset to the anti-zamindar movement. Peasants did not join forces with the jotedars
because they were Muslim, but because they had interdependent material reasons
and because it was in their interest to do so. Rationality and individual interest were
also part of  peasant consciousness. Indian peasantry looked just like peasantry any-
where in Europe, China or the Middle East. The cultural essentialism of  Subaltern
studies, Chibber continues, which conceptualises peasants as unable to recognize
their situation as oppressive, diminishes in fact, subaltern agency. Material interests
are universal at root and anchored in universal desires. Leaving one’s village to find
employment in Calcutta or Paris is motivated by the desire to earn more. When
workers migrate, the need for shelter and work are not peculiarities of  a specific,
let us say Indian, culture. It is rather a matter of  people following their individual
interests. 
Although structural and cultural reasons coincide, conceptualizing ration-
ality outside culture implies that cultural dispositions exist a priori and choices are
just internalised habits. Yet actors do not just make choices according to cultural
norms but also according to material interests. Indian subaltern classes are motivated
towards well-being as much as their Western counterparts. Subalternists’ fascination
with religion and Indigeneity is particularly Orientalist, because it contains the con-
servative belief  in Western singularity. Thinking that something exists in the West
that psychologically determines labouring classes to pursue bourgeois liberties and
basic human rights, autonomy, democracy, and this something lacks in the East, is
exactly what sustains the idea of  Western uniqueness, of  the genius of  Western civ-
ilization onto which imperialism was founded. Subsuming reason as the sole ap-
pendage of  the West constructs the East once again as exoticised and essentialised,
Chibber concludes.
Alternative Politics
Many global protests erupted during the 1990s. Against neoliberalism, against the
dominance of  international finance, against the rise in petroleum prices, government
backed austerity, increased unemployment, against global hunger and against highest
rates of  inequality: in Venezuela around Caracas (1989), Los Angeles (1992), Madrid
(1994), Seattle (1999), Washington (2000), Genoa (2001), Gothenburg (2001),
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Barcelona (2002). According to Prashad, these prompted messages for a fairer dis-
tribution of  resources, for autonomy from private capital, social justice and the right
to well-being. Recently, Ali states, two political moments have challenged the capi-
talist crisis (Chapter 5). First, in 2011, the Arab spring confronted the Western
backed governments, however it ended up exchanging one form of  domination for
another. Second, the general strikes and protests within Southern Europe, for in-
stance in Greece, Spain, aimed to create a new social order inside capitalism and to
challenge Troika’s extreme centre position. 
Although much has happened since Ali’s book was written, at the time, in
2015, Syriza, Podemos, and the radical Independence campaign in Scotland created
indeed the hope for radicalised politics. By now, however, Syriza failed in Pasok’s
steps. Constituted as mass fractions, initially modeled after Hugo Chavez’s party,
Ali continues, Syriza and Podemos tried to imitate South American politics, as in
so far only South America provided political and economical resistance to the US
imperialism and conducted anti-capitalist structural reforms: against IMF, privati-
sation and social restructuring. The Latin America Pink Tide, which included work-
ing class and Indigenous campaigns against neoliberalism, comprised the most
revolutionary movements in the South. Once Chavez took control over the
Venezuelan government, many South American nations elected leftist governments:
Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2006), Chile (2006),
Ecuador (2006), Paraguay (2008) and Peru (2011). Yet a divide developed between
two lefts, Prashad states: the modern and reformist one (Argentina, Brazil, Chile)
coming out of  the traditional left of  the past; and the second left (Venezuela, Bo-
livia, Ecuador) born out of  the Latin American populism and nationalism, which
equated the modern left with neoliberalism (Prashad Chapter 4).
In Ali’s eyes, Scotland represents another example of  political self-deter-
mination (51) aiming to create a Scotland with proper health services, free education,
and social housing. The 2014 independence referendum had the highest level of
voter registration since the introduction of  universal surfage. Britain always treated
Scotland the same way Europe treated Syriza and the New Labour reduced the
Scottish Parliament to the power of  a local council. Ali predicts that within few
years there will be a high demand for another referendum, as polls show that 52%
would vote for separation (48).
Prashad adds to the topic by historicising decades of  anti-colonial strug-
gles within the South (Chapter 1). In 1961 the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was
formed on principles of  egalitarism. It advocated for peace and justice, hoping to
reconstruct the social landscape co-opted by IMF, World Bank and the Atlantic
powers. A central component in its organisation was the UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, which included Africa, Asia, Latin America,
the Socialist Bloc, Yugoslavia, and some Scandinavian countries. UNCTAD was
under attack by the North. In Belgrade in 1983, UNCTAD VI provided a clear
analysis of  the problems of  the South, however it could not put forward a new
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agenda or a new policy direction. It rather reiterated the demands from UNCTAD
V from Manila (1979) and UNCTAD IV from Nairobi (1976).The creation of
BRICS in 2003, although it embraced the neoliberalism with Southern characteris-
tics, it still challenged the orthodoxy of  the Global North, Prashad states. These
states’ hostility towards the US grew from 2002 onwards, when the US began its
war in Iraq. Brazil, India and South Africa issued statements condemning the war
as illegitimate. When BRICS met in 2012 in New Delhi, they critiqued the world
economic order and proposed new policy guidelines. The BRICS states also created
a new credit facility in local currencies to reduce the cost of  trade transactions be-
tween them. The creation of  a new development bank, South Banco Sur (a practical
institutional foundation outside neoliberalism), was additionally explored. 
Prashad writes about the development of  the World Social Forum (WSF)
as a new example of  internationalism opposing the IMF structural reforms. Mainly
comprised of  activists, white-collar workers, students, public employees, WSF em-
bodied a similar pattern from Indignados to Occupy. It met in Mumabi (2004),
Karachi (2006), Nairobi (2007), Belem (2009) and Dakar (2011). The Dakar forum
unfolded over three principled axes: critical analysis of  capitalism; resistance against
capitalism, imperialism and oppression; and the development of  popular alterna-
tives. Some have argued that the forum has now become an annual festival with no
impact. Others, however, have claimed that its ideological strength rests exactly
within its non-hierarchical organization. Yet WSF centred on internal processes (i.e.
who gets to speak and when) and proved itself  incapable of  creating a robust in-
ternationalism. It later fragmented into regional and continental units (i.e. Asia Social
Forum, US Social Forum, etc). 
Academic Complicity 
Current philosophers are unable to interpret the world, Ali states (61). Although
economists have for long argued that speculation should be made illegal and the
focus on finance should be majorly reduced, academics have turned their backs
onto redistributive policies and have showed a break with social democracy. From
Chibber, we can imply that such trend seems particularly connected with the devel-
opment of  post-colonial studies. Subalternists stood out initially because they in-
corporated their radical critique within post-Marxism. Nowadays, according to
Chibber, the postcolonial field lacks coherence and systematicity and is mainly sus-
tained by young fashionable academics, backed up by a plethora of  journals, chairs
and self-styled radical departments, whose aim is mainly career advancement. 
Post-colonial theory is attractive within academia because of  its hostility
to Eurocentrism. Yet Chibber shows that the subaltern field fails to displace Euro-
centrism; it resurrects it, and promotes a hidden Eurocentrism by following the
conceptual antithesis of  the West as the sole site of  reason and East as that of  tra-
ditionalism. Although many critical scholars have rejected such revived Orientalism,
it is very common in North American academia, where these notions have been
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empirically and theoretically defended.
Conclusion
The books are a pleasant read. Engaging, definitely aligned with current political
events, yet very dense. Ali’s text comes with a little bit of  a delay, given the tumul-
tuous changes within Europe during the last couple of  years. Not as radical as it
was preconized, Syriza ended up as the proponent of  the political and economical
status quo, particularly when it accepted EU’s austerity package despite the fact that
in July 2015 the Greeks voted against the Troika Memorandum. The party itself
got divided, and a smaller radical fraction, Popular Unity, was created from within.
The Brexit vote followed a year later, bringing into play ideas of  culture and ideol-
ogy, themselves related to preserving the ideal of  Britishness as a community of
value, although the vote was also prompted by austerity measures targeting the
working class. Ali’s book might be a little bit past its time, especially as his speculative
predictions about Syriza became a political disappointment. Nothing in this political
formation materialised congruently with the radical Pink Tide experienced in the
South. 
Ali’s text also reads as less of  an analysis and more as a description of  the
status-quo. Its structure and format are slightly disjointed. Ali writes about the ex-
treme centre, without clearly defining it from the get-go. He then jumps to enu-
merate former labour ministers’ involvement within the private realm, then to write
about the NHS privatisation. He brushes over many things without fully developing
them. 
Prashad is extremely factual and articulate. He dissects and serves on a
plate the North American dominance, and his analyses are particularly pertinent
within the context of  Donald Trump’s administration and the latest US official at-
tack on Syria. Written up as following an archival investigation, which Prashad
started with the South Commission’s archives in Geneva, the text is filled with an
avalanche of  date-based and location-based facts, making it difficult at times to
draw the line between historical, factual enumerations and actual analyses. Prashad
also jumps back and forward in time and provides sometimes less significant details
regarding who wrote what to whom, when, and under what circumstances, again
making it difficult to follow the “plot.” Prashad’s text brings much needed docu-
mentation on the death of  American liberalism and the birth of  neoliberalism, con-
textualising its up-and-coming approach in the South. He concludes by proposing
three working principles for a twenty-first century Commission: universal access to
basic needs; economic power, as in controlling multinationals and veering away from
“money” as the medium to command economic activity; and a social wage and bet-
ter public goods. 
Chibber’s text is theoretically complex. The connection with Ali and
Prashad rests in the way he approaches the notion of  capital and its universalisation,
however, Chibber’s arguments are also an important step in creating a thorough,
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much-needed critique of  the fields of  subaltern and post-colonial studies. His work
can be adjacently extrapolated to analyses of  institutional diversity which, from cor-
porate hiring practices to diversifying entry numbers at Harvard University, tend to
take up the whole conversational topic within North American academic circles.
Discussions about the commodification of  difference and diversity are important,
especially now that diversity efforts are commodified and culturally tradable on a
new market that capitalism extended to. 
Chibber’s strongest claim, that the subalternist discourse is Orientalist in
essence, and that it misinterprets the universalisation of  capital, lays strong grounds
for a primary critique of  the field of  post-colonial studies. His argument, however,
could come across as negating the South’s subaltern positioning. Critiques of  sub-
altern studies still need to directly and openly acknowledge the inferior positioning
to which the South was subjected. More so, Chibber oftentimes conflates the field
of  subaltern with that of  the post-colonial, although his text merely addresses sub-
altern arguments, and does not thoroughly engage with a broader post-colonial dis-
course. Generalising this critique to the entire field of  post-colonial studies is a
stretch. Oddly, Chibber makes no reference to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s work,
Can the Subaltern Speak, nor does he engage with staple figures from the post-colonial
field, for example Edward Said, to draw the generalised claims he aims towards.
Chibber’s analyses oftentimes read as if  they were conducted at the level of  seman-
tics, containing ad litteram interpretations and mot-à-mot critiques. The reader is be-
stowed with carefully approaching the text to capture all of  its minuscule nuances,
task experienced as repetitive at times. Chibber oftentimes contrasts and compares
ad litteram every sentence of  his opponents’ arguments; as in X endorses Y’s view,
although Y’s view is shaped by M and X also disputes B, although Y agreed with B,
and so on. When Chibber insists on destabilising the rules within History 1 it does
not further develop how capitalism found new ways of  reproducing itself, following
its destabilising crises. For instance, after the 2008 downturn, the financial sectors
were strengthened and capitalism was further readapted.
An indirect aspect resulting from the three works comes from demystify-
ing our understandings of  Europe. Ali shows how the US dominates Europe and
the UK; Prashad demonstrates how Southern Europe is treated much like the
Global South; and Chibber shows that subalterness is not confined to local geog-
raphies. Deconstructing the standing of  the European revolutions as the compari-
son benchmark for subaltern understandings of  Indian bourgeoisie, ads to our
theoretical queries vis-à-vis considerations of  homogenised Eurocentrism. One can-
not just easily infer claims of  a de facto homogenised European dominance and Eu-
rocentrism as it was the case in the immediate post-colonial times. Many parts of
Europe are colonized by capital, and the colonising nation is nowadays the US,
whose dominance is more pungent than ever. It is perhaps time we shift gears from
criticising Eurocentrism and placing the gaze onto Americancentrism. 
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